In the struggle to secure resource rights for rural populations who gain their livelihoods from state-claimed lands, advocacy agendas highlight community interest in, and capacity for, sustainable resource management. In the uplands of Southeast Asia, the strategic simplifications of CBNRM advocacy are being translated into legal frameworks and program initiatives which make rights conditional upon particular forms of social organization and livelihood, as well as conservation outcomes. When set in the context of agricultural intensification among both indigenous and migrant populations, and the desire of many upland dwellers to claim the benefits of a fuller citizenship, CBNRM offers a problematic basis for justice.
INTRODUCTION
The manifest failure of state and market mechanisms to promote sustainable and equitable natural resource management in the developing world has stimulated a search for community based alternatives (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999) . Advocates argue that community based natural resource management (CBNRM) offers the best prospect for meeting conservation objectives while improving the position of impoverished rural communities who have been denied the fundamental right to substantive participation in decisions that impact on their well-being and livelihoods. Arguments in favor of CBNRM thus combine environmental sustainability, social justice, and development efficiency with assertions about practicality and "good sense" (Lynch & Talbott, 1995:6) .
The founding assumption of CBNRM is that people who live close to a resource and whose livelihoods directly depend upon it have more interest in sustainable use and management than state authorities or distant corporations. Advocates acknowledge that there may be exceptions, and recognize that rural people are strategic, rational actors rather than "ecologically noble savages" (Lynch & Talbott, 1995:24) . They also recognize that communities 1 are often internally heterogeneous and unequal. But they argue that none of these cautions or caveats significantly undermine the basic premise of CBNRM (Colchester, 1994; Lynch & Talbott, 1995) . By promoting CBNRM, advocates aim to return to communities the right to 2 control their resources and their futures. Yes but but but ...
Scholars endorsing the aims of CBNRM have considered it important, nonetheless, to offer critical feedback. Indeed, there has been some tension between advocates promoting the government circles, even though the meanings ascribed to these terms and the ways they are translated into action vary. Yet the very success of CBNRM's simplifications in engaging a 4 broad constituency highlights the continued need for critical scrutiny, as broad policy goals are translated into specific laws, programs and projects in different arena of implementation. Success in creating a more just world is measured not by the effectiveness with which a policy idea is sold, or the passing of legislation or regulations which pertain to it, but in the effects on peoples' lives.
Any legal mechanism, policy or broadly based program will encounter a range of local conditions and unique dilemmas in its implementation. Detailed studies of the effects of laws and policies on particular places inevitably indicate that local realities are more complex than policy models suggest. In the case of CBNRM, studies highlight the problems of patronage, class and gender inequities about which advocates have been reminded often enough. My focus in this article is not on the general assumptions and principles of CBNRM. Nor do I offer a case study which shows, for example, how CBNRM assumptions and practices work out in the Sulawesi hills where I have conducted field research (see Li, 2001a; In Press) . Instead, I offer an intermediate level of analysis, which seeks to explore the fit between CBNRM assumptions and the underlying processes and dilemmas encountered in a particular regional context for which CBNRM has been vigorously promoted: the uplands or mountainous interiors of Indonesia and the Philippines. For these areas, are CBNRM's policy-oriented simplifications, and the legal mechanisms CBNRM promotes, broadly on target?
In the first section, I examine prominent characterizations of the upland groups or communities that CBNRM (as it has been promoted in Asia) is intended to benefit. I then subject these characterizations to empirical scrutiny, focusing not so much upon the internal socio-political dynamics of upland communities but on their changing cultural and economic location in, and engagement with, the broad processes transforming the areas where they live and work. By presenting a more complex and differentiated account of the upland scene, I show that the indigenous, forest-dependent, conservation-oriented communities envisaged as the subjects of CBNRM are more difficult to encounter in the uplands than the rhetoric would suggest. The result is that, while some people would benefit from CBNRM provisions, others would find themselves re-assigned to a marginal economic niche that corresponds poorly to the futures they imagine for themselves.
Second, I examine changing state projects regarding the upland terrains in which candidates for CBNRM are located. I argue that CBNRM, rather than rolling back the state and reducing official interference in local affairs, is a vehicle for realigning the relationship between the state and upland citizens. Contrary to the goal of its proponents, there is increasing evidence that CBNRM has the effect of intensifying state control over upland resources, lives and livelihoods. For this reason, some upland citizens may resist programs promoted in the name of CBNRM. For others, better integration into the legal and administrative systems of the state is a desirable outcome. The CBNRM simplification that assumes an inherent separation between community and state, and posits community as a natural entity outside and/or opposed to state processes, fits poorly with the historical and contemporary processes of state and community formation in Southeast Asia's upland regions.
Overall, I will argue that the CBNRM approach advocated for this region, which anchors legal rights in specific practices and identities, locates them in fixed territorial units (communities, ancestral domains) , and makes them conditional upon sustainability outcomes, is at best a partial response to the need of upland people to secure the benefits of a fuller citizenship.
LOCATING CBNRM IN THE UPLANDS: COMMUNITIES, LIVELIHOODS AND CONSERVATION AGENDAS
(a) Representing upland communities: CBNRM simplifications Prominent CBNRM advocates Owen Lynch and Kirk Talbott (1995) and Marcus Colchester (1994) use three main sets of terms to characterize the subjects of their concern. One set emphasizes the impoverishment and political-economic subordination of upland people, victims of the greed and neglect of state and capital. The main mechanism of this subordination has been the definition of the areas they occupy as "public domain" or state land, mostly classified as forest. Their legal status is that of squatters, subject to expulsion and displacement by other users, including timber concessionaires and large scale agricultural or other enterprises with state-granted rights. In the Philippines, this so-called public domain, which covers 60% of the national territory, is home to roughly 24 million people or one third of the nation's population, of whom 6 -10 million are classified as indigenous Lynch & Talbott, 1995:22) . In Indonesia, about 75% of the nation's territory is designated state forestland, and occupied by 40-65 million people (Lynch & Talbott, 1995:22, 55) . 5 A second set of terms emphasizes the distinction between indigenous and nonindigenous people resident in the uplands. In the Philippines, indigenous groups are legally recognized as "indigenous cultural communities." In Indonesia, some upland people and their supporters have mobilized around the term masyarakat adat (people who live in customary ways) but there is very limited legal recognition (Moniaga, 1993) and social boundaries are hard to draw (Li, 2000; Li, 2001b) .
The third set of terms refers to the pursuit of specific sorts of livelihoods and resource management practices. In particular, the subjects of CBNRM are described as "forestdependent communities", "natural resource dependent communities" and pursuers of "subsistence-level", "traditional and sustainable means of livelihood" (Lynch & Talbott, 1995) .
Arrayed in this fashion, these three sets of terms can be seen to range from the most to the least inclusive. The first set incorporates all uplanders with insecure tenure; the second focuses on that component of the upland population which is indigenous; the third specifies that the subjects of special concern are those whose livelihoods are tied to particular resources and highlights most of all those who use resources in sustainable ways.
Here I have separated out various elements in the characterization of the subjects of CBNRM. A key part of the CBNRM strategy in the policy arena depends upon eliding them. The founding assumption of CBNRM is that upland people by virtue of being natural resource-dependent and/or indigenous, either already have, or could be encouraged to adopt, sustainable resource management practices. "Conservation and sustainable development", "sustainable natural resource management", "sustainable forestry", "community-based forestry" and, especially, "sustainable CBNRM" insistently convey an association between upland resource users and environmental protection while glossing over the issue of whether upland communities already have these characteristic, or whether they are instead goals or ideals which could be encouraged or promoted through program initiatives and appropriate incentives. 6 CBNRM uses an environmental hook to tie rights to particular forms of identity, social organization, livelihood and resource management. Uplanders are said to deserve resource rights because they are or could be good resource managers. Through these elisions and simplifications, CBNRM is offered to policy makers as an especially powerful tool, capable of addressing both environment and justice issues as a single package. But is this simplification, and the policy position to which it relates, adequate to the changing character of upland society and landscapes? I will argue that the forest-dwelling, resource-conserving, "traditional" indigenous uplanders who serve as exemplars or embodiments of CBNRM are relatively rare on the upland scene. No doubt they do exist, and their interests should be protected, but we should consider whether the simplification which makes this group the icon of CBNRM helps us (or helps policy makers) understand or address the situation unfolding in Southeast Asia's upland regions. (b) Identifying the subjects of CBNRM: mobility, indigeneity and commitment to place By separating out the various features that are taken to characterize the subjects of CBNRM, a more complex and differentiated picture of upland lifestyles and resource uses comes into view. The factor that all (or almost all) uplanders have in common is that they occupy land defined as public domain to which they have no legally recognized title. Their common problem is indeed a legal one; beyond this, their circumstances, needs, and interests in conservation vary greatly.
Despite the emphasis upon "indigenous people" in the rhetoric surrounding CBNRM, it is important to recall that at least half the people inhabiting the Philippine uplands are migrants of lowland origin. The Indonesian census does not report on ethnic origins, but there is no doubt about the massive scale of planned and spontaneous migration to the uplands in the past few decades (Hardjono, 1986; Li, 1999c; Li, In Press; Peluso, 1995) . People have moved to the uplands in search of land and livelihoods, and they have varying degrees of commitment to the places in which they currently reside. Some migrants have established small holdings and formed stable neighborhoods (Acciaioli, 1998; Hidayati, 1994) . Others are working as farm laborers or tenants, loggers, miners, road builders or general laborers with corresponding patterns of mobility. Not all are impoverished. People have moved to the uplands not only because of a "push" from below, but because of the "pull" from above, where there are or have been many good opportunities both on and off farm. Migrants are, however, especially vulnerable to sudden declines in the resources upon which they depend: ejected from lucrative logging jobs or failed plantations, for example, they are set adrift. In Indonesia, researchers have argued that it is people in this category who are the most deprived, exploited and vulnerable of all upland inhabitants (Brookfield, Potter, & Byron, 1995:235; Ruiter, 1999) .
The extent to which diverse and sometimes mobile uplanders form "communities" coherent enough to have, or to develop, systems of natural resource management and allocation (let alone sustainable and equitable ones) is varied. There are reports of rapacious, short term use of land by migrants working their way along logging roads or other points of access (Lopez, 1987; McCarthy, 2000a:112; Vayda & Sahur, 1985) . There are also reports of migrants developing sustainable resource systems by emulating indigenous practices or inventing new ones suited to their new environments. In one case in the Philippines, migrants made use of the short term "boom-bust" profits from logging and "open" access to frontier land to establish sustainable, mixed agroforestry -a system which migrants often do not have sufficient time and space to develop, but which, in this case, they selected because of its favorable returns (Fujisaka & Wollenberg, 1991) . Several researchers now argue that there is a "continuum of farming systems" practiced by both indigenes and migrants, making sharp distinctions unhelpful (McCarthy, 2000a:112) .
Reports of frontier settlement in the Philippines observe that migrants tend to refer to indigenous land as state land, and generally treat it as open access, while having recourse to "official" mechanisms such as tax payment to bolster their claims (Anderson, 1987; Lopez, 1987) . Thus for migrant groups, unsurprisingly, the reference point for rights and obligations in relation to natural resources is the idea of "the state" and, more specifically, the state-system at its various levels (from the Philippine barangay or Indonesian desa upwards) than "the community" conceived, as Lynch and Talbott propose, in terms of autonomous rule-making (1995:25, 117) .
Even among the indigenous population, however, the existence of communities as "natural units" for CBNRM is not guaranteed. In Indonesia, indigenous people are not necessarily formed into bounded groups, with a clear sense of territorial possession of the type implied by the Philippine category "ancestral domain" (Li, 2000; Tsing, 1993) . State agencies have long refused to acknowledge that some Indonesians are more "indigenous" than others, although this position is softening (Li, 2001b) . In the Philippines, the colonially imposed separation of hispanicized and non-hispanicized groups makes for sharper distinctions (McDermott, 2001:36) . Nevertheless, in both countries, indigenous people have often been mobile, sometimes voluntarily as they seek better opportunities, other times due to demographic shifts or one or more episodes of displacement (Brookfield et al., 1995; McDermott, 2001) . Many no longer live on the land of their ancestors, and new and old migrants are often interspersed among them. For years the World Bank in Jakarta has been sponsoring efforts by scholars and NGOs to map indigenous groups and territories but neat, well defined units have yet to materialize and the issue of definitions is unresolved (Evers, 1995) . Identifying "on the ground" indigenous communities that fit the model presupposed by CBNRM is more difficult in practice than the simplified model would indicate.
(c) Upland livelihoods, natural resources and market involvements Even when "indigenous people" have been identified, it is not self evident that their livelihoods will be any more "natural resource based" than those of other upland dwellers. They too work as wage laborers in extractive industries, large farms or in the lowlands and cities either seasonally or for long periods. The characterization of indigenous people as 7 forest-resource dependent is even more problematic. There are less than a million hectares of old growth forest left in the Philippines, and less than six million hectares contain any significant tree cover (Lynch & Talbott, 1995:58) . Thus most of the officially classified "forest" land in the Philippine uplands is not forested. Although the remaining Philippine forests are primarily within indigenous territories most uplanders, even indigenous ones, do not live in forested areas. Similarly in Indonesia, a large proportion of officially-classified forest land is denuded of trees, although there remains significant forest cover in inaccessible areas of Kalimantan and West Papua.
Indigenous people who do live in or near forests do not necessarily wish to sustain them as forests. Small scale logging, rattan collection, and, most importantly, temporary or permanent conversion of forest to agricultural uses have long been part of the livelihood repertoire of indigenous uplanders as well as migrants (Brookfield et al., 1995:112-142; Brown, 1994) . Sustainable swidden cycles are rare now in the Philippines (Brown, 1994:45) , although there are some places where they are still viable in Indonesia. Population growth, land expropriations, and settler influx have reduced the areas available to indigenous farmers. In some cases, these pressures have forced them into a pernicious, destructive form of agriculture (Brown, 1994:45) while in other cases, they have successfully intensified their farming systems (Brookfield et al., 1995; Brown, 1994; Lopez, 1987; Padoch & Peluso, 1996) . There are two points to make here: first, the squeeze on swidden and other extensive farming systems has already occurred and will not be reversed; to describe uplanders as "forest-dependent" does not help to address this, even if the forms of intensification adopted happen to involve tree crops (rubber, cocoa, fruit etc.). Second, even without these pressures, many would still have elected to intensify or, where conditions permit, extensify agriculture in order to increase their access to cash.
Market involvement has long been characteristic of Indonesia's "indigenous" population. Smallholder tree crops, many of them grown by "indigenous" people, contributed 12% to agricultural GDP in 1992, while the plantation sector (still the focus of most government attention) contributed only 5% (Barlow, 1996:8) . In some places with relatively low resource pressure, such as the areas of Kalimantan described by Dove (1993b) and Peluso (1996) rubber or fruit tree groves integrated with swiddens and sometimes sawah probably meet the criteria of sustainable agroforestry. Other celebrated examples of resource management systems which produce commercial crops in a sustainable manner using traditional practices are the Damar gardens of Krui in Sumatra (Michon, Foresta, Kusworo, & Levang, 2000) and rattan plantations of Bentian (Fried, 2000) . Elsewhere, under conditions of land shortage and the need and desire for increased cash incomes, commercial tree groves displace both forest and, sometimes, annual crop production including food crops (Li, In Press; Suryanata, 1999) . In 9 both Indonesia and the Philippines, production of temperate fruit and vegetables for urban markets has become very important (Brown, 1994:46, 57; Hardjono, 1991; Hefner, 1990) .
Agricultural intensification has led to social and economic changes somewhat akin to those experienced in the lowland green revolution, with the critical difference that the "agrarian transformation" of the uplands has been largely the result of local small holder initiatives rather than state sponsored programs (Hart, Turton, & White, 1989; Li, 1999b) . Much of this intensification has occurred, moreover, on "state lands" officially classified as forests (Vayda & Sahur, 1985) . Insecure tenure has sometimes been a problem, as when small holders are displaced by large scale agri-business ventures seeking to exploit the same lands and market opportunities that small holders have pioneered and developed with remarkable efficiency (White, 1999) . Nevertheless, upland small holders continue to invest labor and capital to retain their place as the most persistent, numerous, and productive contributors to commercially-oriented agriculture, much of it tree-crop based (Potter & Lee, 1998:7) .
The boom in small holder tree crop production is unmistakable. A survey conducted in Indonesia during the recent economic crisis, a period during which observers expected food security to be a priority, showed instead that the clearing of land for food production decreased both relatively and absolutely, while land dedicated to commercial tree crop holdings expanded (Sunderlin, Resosudarmo, Rianto, & Anglesen, 2000:34-36) . High export prices pegged to the US dollar, and the attempt to use trees as a mechanism to consolidate land claims at a time when political uncertainty weakened forest-boundary enforcement account for Indonesia's tree-crop fever, but these factors only accentuate a pre-existing trend (Sunderlin et al., 2000:42-43) . No doubt there are people who will lose from this transition: indigenous small holders have often been displaced as their land is taken over by local elites or migrants whose capital and connections enable them to better withstand market and ecological adversities (Brookfield et al., 1995:30; Elson, 1997:90, 99, 102, 240; Hefner, 1990; Hirsch, 1993:105; Suryanata, 1999) . I doubt, however, that processes of agrarian differentiation of this scale can be reversed by CBNRM, especially when migrants and indigenes alike opt for new crops and intensified market involvement in the expectation that their lives and livelihoods will thereby improve (Li, In Press; Suryanata, 1999) . (d) Conservation agendas: marginality reconfirmed?
In the context of these intensifying market involvements, what are the implications of the 1991 Philippines Integrated Protected Areas Act and its attendant regulations according to which "the zoning of a protected area and its buffer zones shall not restrict the rights of indigenous communities to pursue traditional and sustainable means of livelihood within their ancestral domain" (Lynch & Talbott, 1995:90) ? What is the legal position of these indigenous communities should they elect to cut forest and expand commercial agriculture? What happens if they fail to live up to the ecological standards expected of them as "traditional and indigenous people"? Are they well served by outsider images and expectations, especially when translated into requirements and obligations under new national laws? As Brown observes, "tribal peoples are not being asked if or how they want to manage these forests" (Brown, 1994:95) . For Lynch and Talbott, a resource management system only qualifies as "community-based" if the rules for resource allocation and "management" are set primarily (though not exclusively) by communities themselves (1995:25) . But there is a tension between this position and the assertion that the outcome of that management -sustainability -should be monitored and indeed enforced by the state (Lynch & Talbott, 1995:121) , whether or not this fits with local priorities and "imagined futures". Hence Lynch and Talbott's difficult "Balancing Act". "Sustainable" is potentially incompatible with "community-based" when the agenda for upland development is set by government officials, NGOs or donors preoccupied by environmental concerns and convinced about the necessity and wisdom of trees (Rocheleau & Ross, 1995) . Brown (1994) raises these concerns specifically in regard to the Philippines, but the same issues have arisen in many contexts where imposed environmental agendas framed in participatory rhetorics have reduced the political and economic security of rural populations (Fairhead & Leach, 1996; McKinnon, 1997; Rangan, 1993; Ribot, 1996) .
As others have noted, the politics of the environment are such that a new willingness on the part of national elites and resource bureaucracies to recognize the existence and address the needs of upland people does not necessarily mean that long-standing inequalities in resource access have been reversed (Barber, 1989; Gauld, 2000; McDermott, 2001) . The timing of new forest policies and programs is an indicator: in both the Philippines and Indonesia, uplanders were offered new forms of tenure in the "national" forest estate only after the best and most lucrative opportunity in the uplands, namely timber extraction, had run its course, and elites had found better investments. The natural resources left in the uplands are, increasingly, marginal rather than central to the national economy. The time when 10 community-based natural resource control would really have paid off, the timber boom of the 1970s and 1980s, has passed. Uplanders are now being offered more control over land and natural resources, but only on condition that in the interests of sustainability, biodiveristy and the needs of future generations, they take on responsibility for conserving the little forest that is left and limit their economic aspirations accordingly. What are the implications for justice?
Without denying the populist commitments of innovative legislators and advocates, it is necessary to consider the possibility that the rural people designated as appropriate subjects for CBNRM are expected to conserve trees and soil rather than exploit them for profit because they are poor and marginal, and can therefore be asked to bear a burden from which more powerful players are exempt. Michael Dove has drawn attention to the power relations embedded in the conservationist agenda which proposes that "minor forest products" be promoted to meet the (apparently limited) income needs of forest-dwelling people, while the truly profitable resource, timber, is allocated to others. In criticizing this logic, which he dubs "rainforest crunch", he points out that whenever poor people stumble upon or develop lucrative opportunities, these are quickly removed from them. Therefore, according to Dove, the "search for "new" sources of income for "poor forest dwellers" is often, in reality, a search for opportunities that have no other claimants -a search for unsuccessful development alternatives" (Dove, 1993a:18) . Poverty, powerlessness and exclusion from valuable resources are integrally related. Such economic and political linkages are obscured when "forest" communities are viewed through a lens that stresses "tradition", "sustainability" or "subsistence" and implies that marginality is an elected way of life.
In agriculture as in forest protection, unexamined assumptions about the subsistenceand-conservation priorities of farmers, and the overwhelming conservation preoccupations of outsiders, have resulted in the promotion of agricultural innovations whose economic potential is unproven. If adopted, they have the potential to impoverish upland people. In 11 Thailand, for example, adopters of alley cropping did not experience the increases in production that were promised. They found instead that their fields were invaded by grasses or ravaged by wild animals seeking easy forage. Those determined to resist imposed conservation measures limited their participation to a "token line" designed to please outsiders or avoid sanctions (Enters, 1995) . Similarly in the Philippines, Brown (1994:56) describes the vigor with which NGOs and government agencies have promoted "sloping agricultural land technology" (SALT) and the reluctance of uplanders to adopt it, presumably because they have recognized that it does not benefit them. 12 Even when agricultural improvement programs are successful in economic terms they may still fail to meet the conservation objectives of their proponents if the implications of market engagement are misunderstood. An agroforestry program in Indonesia was designed on the assumption that increased profitability of tree-crops (through improved seed stock and marketing) would relieve pressure on neighboring forests. However, instead of sitting back when their (supposedly limited) needs were met, farmers responded to the new opportunities by expanding their production into the forests, and migrants (not necessarily poor ones) were also attracted into the area (Angelsen, 1995; Tomich & van Noordwijk, 1995) .
Oil palm plantations are the current focus of Indonesian government initiatives to boost export earnings, and vast areas of logged over land have been designated for this purpose in Sumatra, Kalimantan and West Papua. Much of this land is subject to customary claims, and supporters of CBNRM and indigenous land rights have launched a campaign calling for a moratorium on oil palm on the combined grounds of environment, livelihoods and social justice (Ruwindrijarto et al., 2000) . A closer look at the oil palm question reveals, as usual, more complexity. In some cases, land has been grabbed from communities using coercive tactics, backed by the military, and villagers have been imprisoned for resisting (Ruwindrijarto et al., 2000) . In other cases, however, villagers have welcomed oil palm when the conditions have been favorable to them (Potter & Lee, 1998:7, 26, 37) . Key to their satisfaction are the terms of the contract linking their land, labor and production to the nucleus estate with its processing and marketing facilities. As Ben White has argued (1999), contract farming need not be disadvantageous to farmers: everything depends upon the relative power of the parties to negotiate a fair deal, and the surrounding political climate (intimidation and patronage, or democracy and the rule of law).
According to a field study conducted in 1997/8 (Potter & Lee, 1998) , issues of concern to villagers whose land is zoned for oil-palm include the relative proportions of the land they must give up to the estate versus the portion they retain, ready planted with oil-palm; the rate of compensation for land acquired; the extent of the debt they incur for land development and transparency in its administration; the returns for their product (often lower than was promised); the availability of work and rates of pay; the degree of autonomy over current and future land uses; and the opportunity cost of commitment to a monocrop with an uncertain market future. Facilities such as roads and schools are also highly prized, because they enable households to diversify both on and off farm, by educating children for better jobs, engaging in trade, and seeking seasonal or urban employment. Through their participation in this new economic sector they seek, in short, both enhanced livelihoods and social justice. The same study found that conservation, biodiversity, and the communitarian social values associated with CBNRM have played a very limited role in villagers' assessments of oil palm (Potter & Lee, 1998:28) .
The component of the CBNRM platform of very high relevance to small holders faced with oil palm is recognition of their land rights: only when these rights are recognized, whether de facto or de jure, can they enter into a bargaining posture with oil palm estates (Potter & Lee, 1998) . Without such recognition, they are vulnerable to brutal treatment and expropriation. Plantation companies sometimes ignore customary resource rights on the grounds that their official lease trumps any locally-recognized entitlements (Ruwindrijarto et al., 2000:14) . However, since the end of Suharto's New Order, villagers and their NGO supporters have become more vocal and persistent in their claims, and plantation and timber companies recognize that they must negotiate or face expensive delays, blockades and sabotage (McCarthy, 2000a:107; McCarthy, 2000b) . In the face of oil palm's inexorable advance, Potter and Lee (1998) argue that improving the terms on which villagers deal with plantations would have more impact on their future well being than the many donor-driven conservation programs attempting to restore and intensify indigenous agroforestry systems. 13 Conservation agendas which assume that upland farmers have (or should have) subsistence goals often run counter to the long term futures which they imagine and towards which they strive. These futures may include participation, together with lowlanders and city folk, in increasingly generic, nation-wide, middle class consumption styles. Eder (1994) observes that Batak people in the Philippines see themselves, simultaneously, as a deprived underclass lacking the resources (but not the desire) to pursue lowland Filipino lifeways as well as proud bearers of a tribal identity. In the Tengger highlands of Java, Hefner (1990) found that farmers did not anticipate a future in the hills. They were counting on the profits from intensive (and destructive) vegetable production to educate their children and launch them on non-agrarian careers, preferably in the bureaucracy. These are not exceptional situations, and it is not clear that they can be rectified by better technologies and program incentives. They are the predictable outcomes of changing patterns of production and the dynamics of culture and class in contemporary upland settings. They tend to be ignored, overlooked or explained away in order to protect the "strategic simplifications" embedded in CBNRM.
Unless outsider-driven efforts to design better resource management institutions are clearly rooted in local priorities, they will fail to find the active, concerned local constituency which the notion of "sustainable CBNRM" seems to guarantee. Meanwhile urban, industrial, agro-industrial and other large scale resource users as well as chemical-dependent lowland farmers, their profit motives unquestioned, are subjected to conservation standards which are very much less rigorous than those expected of "communities", especially upland and/or indigenous ones (Brown, 1994:55) .
The Philippines 1995 presidential Executive Order that proclaims "Community-based forest management shall be the national strategy to achieve sustainable forestry and social justice" McDermott, 2001:32) looks rather less promising in light of the forgoing analysis. It pertains specifically to forests, presumably those remote and inaccessible forest remnants with which indigenous people are associated, but not the millions of hectares of official "forest" land which indigenous and other uplanders continue to cultivate without secure rights. Its limitations as a "national strategy to achieve social justice" have already been pointed out. In effect, the decree allocates marginal resources to marginal people, to be used in limited ways which are only marginally productive for those people but which have rather significant benefits to the nation (especially its national image and access to donor funds), the globe (concerned with biodiversity, forest cover), and future generations of eco-tourists (both Filipino and foreign) who will be able to contemplate nature and natives preserved in place. There clearly are major issues of justice at stake in the distribution of upland resources and the allocation of responsibilities for their management. However, "sustainable CBNRM", by fusing the issue of resource entitlements with that of conservation, may compound rather than resolve these. Divergent interests are mis-recognized when conservation by communities is presented as "simple common sense".
STATE AND LOCAL AGENDAS IN THE UPLANDS: RECONFIGURING LANDSCAPES AND RELATIONSHIPS
In this section, I examine changing state projects regarding the upland terrains in which candidates for CBNRM are located. I argue that, contrary to the goal of its proponents, CBNRM may serve as a vehicle for intensifying state control over upland communities. I also suggest that, for some upland citizens at least, a closer relationship to the state and a fuller incorporation in state projects may be a desirable outcome. Rather than strengthening rural citizens against the state, CBNRM serves as a vehicle for renegotiating the responsibilities and rights of citizenship. It is not, however, the only possible vehicle and its strengths and weaknesses need therefore to be evaluated in relation to the alternatives. (a) State agendas and mechanisms for rule Of particular relevance in the contemporary uplands is the process of territorialization through which "All modern states divide their territories into complex and overlapping political and economic zones, rearrange people and resources within these units, and create regulations delineating how and by whom these areas can be used" (Vandergeest & Peluso, 1995:387) . Such measures have been undertaken by both colonial and post-colonial regimes, seeking profits for favored elites, tax revenues to support administrative systems, or the assertion of state authority in areas not fully enmeshed in state-defined institutions and processes. Always ongoing and incomplete, territorializing initiatives are commonly contested by the populace. Moreover they involve many government departments, each with different and possibly conflicting approaches. Strategies for increased control may include privatizing natural resources (within state-defined frameworks) or direct state management; encouraging settlement in unpopulated areas or forbidding settlement; centralizing administrative authority or devolving authority to lower levels. The making of maps, the conduct of censuses, the drawing up of village boundaries and lists, classification and staking forests can all be seen as mechanisms to define, regulate and assert control over the relationship between population and resources.
Territorializing initiatives in the uplands of the Philippines and Indonesia as well as Thailand, the focus of Vandergeest and Peluso's analysis, have historically been less intense than those in the lowlands, but their importance is increasing. Nominal control over the Philippine uplands was obtained at the end of the nineteenth century by the US colonial power when it devised and promoted the "Regalian Doctrine" proclaiming state prerogative over upland territory on the (disputed) grounds that the previous Spanish regime had assumed full sovereignty over land and resources (Lynch & Talbott, 1995:41-46; McDermott, 2001:34) . Under Marcos, this doctrine was strengthened by various legal instruments to permit state allies to conduct large scale resource extraction, leaving people living on "state" forest land vulnerable to eviction (Brown, 1994; Lynch & Talbott, 1995:60) . In Indonesia, a clause in the 1945 constitution assigns the government responsibility for managing forest land for the benefit of the population. Under Suharto's New Order regime, this clause was interpreted to mean total state control, providing the mandate for the 1967 The Basic Forest Law which declared about 75% of Indonesia's territory (mostly in the uplands) to be "forest" land under the control of the Ministry of Forestry, and defined the populations living there as squatters Moniaga, 1993) . As in the Philippines, the 1967 law ushered an era of massive state-backed logging of the forests, especially in the uplands and interiors of the so-called "outer islands" (off Java). Post-Suharto, a new forest law passed in 1999 under Habibie's interim regime incorporated some populist language and made provisions for various forms of community participation in forest management, but it did not fundamentally change the status of "national forest" land.
Beginning in the 1990s, territorialization initiatives have taken the form of increased recognition of the existence of upland populations. Throughout the period of rapacious logging, it was convenient for government authorities in both the Philippines and Indonesia to undercount, ignore, or deny the existence of the sizable populations living and deriving their livelihoods from this "state" forest land. A forest department can ignore a few squatters in "state forests", but to acknowledge that there are millions of people on this land is to acknowledge that it is not really in control, that it cannot implement its own laws. During this period, uplanders were people neither the forest agency nor any other government department had a structural interest in "seeing", at least officially. Advocates for CBNRM 14 point out the negative effects of this invisibility on upland people: namely, their insecure resource tenure, and vulnerability to expulsion. But the time came when invisibility also 15 posed problems for the ruling regimes: it made it difficult -or downright contradictory -to set about developing administrative procedures to engage with upland citizens, count them, locate them, list them and enmesh them in the cultural and political rituals of citizenship. Moreover state-mandated programs planned on the basis of an unpopulated terrain were always contested. Except when state agencies were able or willing to enforce them coercively, the attempt to implement such programs drew government officials into all kinds of uneasy compromises (Li, 1999a; Peluso, 1995) . Rules which are contradictory, which are designed not to work or which are not enforced outlaw much of the population, and render their loyalties ambivalent. 16 The increasing appeal of CBNRM to government authorities over the past decade can be interpreted in terms of a shift in territorializing strategies and state priorities regarding the uplands. The logging boom over, direct state control over natural resources is less important. What has become urgent in both countries, but especially the Philippines with its ongoing insurgency (McDermott, 2001:35) , is the establishment of control over upland populations by pinning them in place, regularizing their resource use according to state-defined rules and procedures and, through the extension of institutions and bureaucratic processes, enmeshing them more firmly as state clients.
(b) CBNRM and the intensification of rule in the Philippines and Indonesia One impulse behind high level support for the array of community focused programs adopted in the Philippine uplands is, undoubtedly, the imperative to intensify government control over people. There are also more particular, departmental concerns. Through its various community forestry initiatives, DENR regularizes the position of small holders who are already present on "its" land. The delineation of ancestral domains, similarly, helps to pin indigenous populations in place, and produces the requisite lists, maps, agreements and lines of authority (McDermott, 2001) . Having laid claim to "its" population, and provided for their welfare and development, DENR is better able to defend "its" land from poaching by other state agencies -e.g. mining, agriculture. In this transaction DENR gets, according to a recent study, "quite a bargain." It allocates to communities only land which is already denuded of trees, and extracts from them cheap labor in reforestation and protection (McDermott, 2001:35) . At the same time, DENR retains the powers assumed under the Regalian doctrine to allocate timber concessions (now called Industrial Forest Management Agreements) on residual forest lands when it is profitable or politically expedient to do so. A study of the DENR observed that this department continues to be dominated by professional, technicallytrained foresters who are very dubious of community capacity to undertake "scientific forest management" and meet timber production targets, although they welcome donor funds for community forestry which have provided a welcome boost to the department's prestige and resources (Gauld, 2000) . 17 My argument is not that DENR's community forestry programs are a screen for Machiavellian plans to manipulate citizens, nor are they the seamless product of social engineering. They have been a response, in part at least, to popular pressure, to policy advocacy for CBNRM, and to the environmental preoccupations of donors (Gauld, 2000; McDermott, 2001) . Their effects, like their origins, have been complex and contradictory. Giving rights to participants in social or community "forestry", and recognizing ancestral domains both incorporates these populations in state projects and empowers them to contest and frustrate those projects in ways they could not previously, from their status as squatters or "invisible people". Thus state power and peoples' power, both of which were previously rather diffuse in the uplands where many rules were not enforced, and therefore not contested (Brown, 1994:47) , have become concentrated in such matters as the identification of appropriate program beneficiaries, boundary delineations, and the interpretation of terms like "traditional" or "sustainable". Community forestry and the recognition of ancestral domains are fertile grounds for both co-optation and dissent, in ways that continue to evolve. The significant number of applications for the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC) in the Philippines (seventy nine claims covering more than a million hectares by 1997), together with the moratorium on CADC approvals declared by the incoming Estrada administration in 1998 (Bryant, 2000:693) , indicates that, whatever the limitations of the program, important material and symbolic resources are indeed at stake. 18 If community forestry provides one framework for renegotiating the relations between government and people, the Philippine 1991 Local Government Code provides another. The Code is intended to devolve control over natural resources and numerous other aspects of government to local levels. This measure would appear to address one of the initial concerns of CBNRM: the problem with decisions being made by "distant" states. It brings government programs closer to the local level, where presumably they are to be tailored according to local needs and conditions. Whether the more intensive presence and visibility of "the state" at local levels will increase accountability is an open question. According to a recent study, paternalistic power structures remain entrenched in rural areas (Guevara, 2000) and intensified patterns of patronage and land grabbing by newly empowered local officials have been observed (Brown, 1994:64-5) . At any rate, this legal strategy is clearly different from, and possibly counter to the logic of CBNRM as a system in which "property rights by definition emanate from communities" (Lynch & Talbott, 1995: 117, emphasis in the original). The Local Government Code locates control firmly in the hands of state-derived administrative units, and encourages people to look towards and work with the "the state", rather than extra-state community based structures and practices, to strengthen their hold over resources and improve livelihoods.
In 2001, a decade after the Philippine initiative, Indonesia commenced a comparable program of decentralization which devolves considerable powers to the regency level of government, and invites a revival of traditional terminologies and practices for local governance. Despite the populist rhetoric, village-level governance structures are hardly mentioned in the legislation, and it is unclear, for the moment, whether villagers will be able to strengthen their control over the natural resources on which they depend, or be subjected to intensified appropriation and exploitation by regency and provincial authorities seeking revenue and "development" (Potter & Lee, 1999:12) . Evidently, bringing "government" closer to "the people" is not simply a matter of spatial arrangements, and the meaning of terms such as "local" and "community" is hotly contested. 19 Besides the conflicting claims of various levels of government, different departments continue to vie for access to upland resources. In Indonesia, as in the Philippines, the Department of Forestry has had to defend its position vis a vis other departments which eye "forest" lands for other uses, and suggest alternative ways to bring order and "development" to the huge land areas and populations under Forestry control. As noted earlier, the Department of Agriculture covets the massive logged-over lands of Kalimantan and Sumatra for conversion to oil palm plantations (Potter & Lee, 1999) . Community forestry programs can be seen, in part at least, as an attempt to forestall more clearly agricultural alternatives that would remove territory from Department of Forestry control. Under the banner of "development", "environment" and "participation" these programs promise to address the needs of the people by permitting limited livelihoods to be gained from "forests" under the control and guidance of the Forest Department (Barber, 1989:410-411) . Long time opponents, forest villagers are now to become allies of the Forest Department in its project to retain control over its domain. At the same time, coercive removal of those practicing unregulated small holder agriculture within "forest" zones continues to be a government policy.
The flurry of forest legislation in Indonesia post-Suharto reveals the limits of community forestry as a basis for legal rights to forest land. Like its 1967 predecessor, the 1999 Forest Law recognizes the category customary forest (hutan adat) but continues to subsume it within the national forest estate (hutan negara), subject to the control of the Department of Forestry. Like village forests (hutan desa) and community forests (hutan kemasyarakatan), hutan adat is treated as a unit of forest management which must be officially identified, licensed and monitored by the Department, conforming to detailed regulations about use. In "customary forest" (slated for indigenous folk) rights extend only to forest product collection, although in "community forests" some logging is allowed (McCarthy, 2000a:121) . In both cases, clearing land for agricultural purposes is forbidden, unless it has been designated for conversion to large scale plantations. Thus shifting cultivation and small holder tree crop production are still criminalized. Forest villagers are enjoined to participate in guarding and reforestation, but they have no role in decision making and are assumed to need continuing education and topdown guidance from the Department. A Ministerial Decree on Community Forestry (Hutan Kemasyarakatan, SK 677/Kpts-II/1998 ) similarly confirms that community forestry is about the granting of permits for forest use to community groups constituted for the purpose, not about government recognition of pre-existing rights that stem from people's long term residence within, or dependence upon, the forest estate. According to the matrix prepared by Diah Rahajo (30/09/99), its implementation will require a host of information gathering and registration measures, the effect of which will be to intensify government control over community activity in forests.
From the perspective of the Indonesian Department of Forestry, it matters little whether the operation of fixing people in place and delimiting their boundaries and rights is accomplished under the rules for customary forests, village forests or community forests. Regardless of their label, the effect of these programs is the same: to recognize people's presence in forested areas while conceding nothing on the issue of rights, and enmeshing them more securely in state regulatory regimes. Of course, to move from a list of schemes for forest allocation to their imposition on people and landscapes requires a huge administrative effort in mapping, listing, regulating and excluding which the current government is not equipped to undertake. Moreover the authority of the government to define such programs is itself contested: many Indonesian NGOs as well as prominent parliamentarians protested the new forest law on the grounds that it failed to acknowledge customary rights. They continue to advocate the recognition of rights which are, in Lynch and Talbott's terms, community-based that is, which derive from within the community, as opposed to being granted by the state. Activists are currently debating how to move forward on community forestry: some argue that anything short of government recognition of existing customary land rights and uses (including agrarian ones) is unworthy of the label "community-based", while others argue that top-down, government-style community forestry offers a significant opening to secure local access rights, the limits on which can later be revised. Thus the "state simplifications" (Scott, 1998) embodied in the new forest law do not in fact simplify, nor do they necessarily prevail, rather they open up new arena within which state-society relations can be reworked. (c) Processes of state and community formation In its approach to communities, CBNRM misses an important step. It takes community as an essence or starting point (for identities, rules, and notions of justice) rather than as the (provisional) result of community-forming processes. It ignores the deep and subtle ways in which communities, states and NGOs are mutually implicated in relations laced with power. It also underestimates the significance of local initiatives intended to intensify, rather than withdraw from, engagements with state institutions.
In Indonesia , CBNRM rhetoric tends to locate the essence of community in a precolonial past, then truncate the time frame such that autonomous communities are assumed to have persisted throughout the colonial and post-colonial period, up to the time of intensified logging beginning in the 1960s (Peluso 1995:399) . The nature of that pre-colonial past is, of course, difficult to research. No doubt there was significant variation in the degree of community coherence and autonomy experienced by local groups across the archipelago. For the colonial and post-colonial period, historical and ethnographic studies of some remote locations in Indonesia's indigenous, upland interior have shown that "communities" were not natural units, but rather were formed, or at least re-formed, by or in interaction with the programs and initiatives of governing regimes (Henley, In Press; Li, 2001c; Tsing, 1993) . Certainly today there are few geographical locations, if any, in which "communities" could be said to have an autonomous existence outside the structures of state control. Similarly, the state-system is instantiated in upland communities. As Hirsch (1989:35) observes for rural Thailand, it is misleading to assume "an extra-village or urban location of the state". Rather than intensified state territorial control arising as a pre-formed center moves outwards to colonize and incorporate pre-formed communities on the peripheries, the historical record suggests that state formation and community formation have proceeded simultaneously as part of a single process (Agrawal, 2001; Li, 1999b; Sundar, 2000:257) .
Under favourable conditions, migrants and indigenous uplanders alike have sought opportunities to realign their relationship to the state-system, and thereby legitimate their presence and consolidate their hold over resources. They want and need to be enmeshed in administrative structures and processes in order to claim their place as citizens and clients. Thus they begin to form themselves, or strengthen their formation, as communities as they engage with state-institutions, procedures and personnel (Li, 1996; Tsing, 1999) . The irony is that, through intensified interactions with state institutions and NGOs, communities can be simultaneously formed, transformed, co-opted and constituted as possible loci of demand for, or opposition to, state projects (Agrawal, 2001; McDermott, 2001) .
Just as state power is not absolute, it must be stressed that it is not necessarily malevolent: territorialization is a normal state activity, not one peculiar to oppressive regimes. Environmentalists and supporters of peasant struggles who assume that "traditional communities" are inclined to oppose "the state" in order to preserve "their own" institutions and practices underestimate the extent to which uplanders seek the benefits of a fuller citizenship. Their demands commonly include access to roads, education, and health facilities. The oppositional characterization of "virtuous peasants" and "vicious states" (Bernstein, 1990:71) fails to do justice to the complexities of state-local relations and associated class structuring processes (Hart, 1989; Nugent, 1994) . It neglects the claims upon the state-system for access to modernity which characterize many peasant and indigenous people's movements (Rigg, 1997; Schuurman, 1993) , just as others reject and resist state imperatives. In the Kalimantan case discussed by Tsing (1999) , Meratus Dayaks did not oppose state territorial strategies of mapping and road building; rather, they wanted to ensure that their community was on official maps and roads, a regularized and recognized component of the national framework. In many instances, uplanders are not rejecting development but particular, localized experiences with a development which removes sources of livelihood without providing viable alternatives, fails to bring promised benefits, or distributes resources unevenly (Li, 1999b) .
CONCLUSION
CBNRM has been an important strand in a broader advocacy agenda intended to draw attention to the number of people living in the uplands, to highlight the ways in which they are marginalized and disadvantaged, to show that many of the negative stereotypes about them have been misplaced, and to propose alternatives. The attention-getting agenda has been well-served by the simplification which inverts negative stereotypes, replacing the image of the uplander as a backward peasant wantonly destroying state resources with the image of the coherent, stable and environmentally responsible upland community. As a result of this advocacy work, something of a paradigm shift has occurred at least in the ways uplanders are viewed, if not in the ways they are treated. Coercive "official" conservation which insists on removing people from parks, for example, must now contend with a competing paradigm (Bryant, 2000; Peluso, 1993) . A problem arises, however, in the attempt to turn the simplified counter-image into a reality, and treat it as a basis for legal strategies and the search for justice. At this level, it is my view that CBNRM serves upland people less well. Of course, advocates do not claim that CBNRM is the solution to all problems, nor will it fit all groups and situations with their local idiosyncrasies. It is for that reason that I have focused upon underlying processes and tried to assess whether CBNRM and its attendant simplifications are broadly on target for an extensive population potentially affected by them. My conclusion is that, as a legal strategy, CBNRM in the form it is currently being promoted in Asia is most compatible with the interests of those who are its icons: unusually isolated, forest-dependent, resourceconserving, "traditional" indigenous communities so prominent in the uplands as an "imagined country" (Short, 1991) but rare in its actual configurations.
As a legal strategy for the majority of upland people, "sustainable" CBNRM imposes some severe limitations. It makes legal entitlements to resources conditional upon discriminatory and probably unenforceable environmental pre-requisites (Brown, 1994:55; McDermott, 2001:39) . Although the environmental hook has been useful in gaining allies, support, and donor funds, I am not convinced that this limitation is a necessary one -that it is only on this basis that uplanders can gain secure rights to the resources upon which they depend. For this reason I believe it is important to keep questioning the hegemonic claims of environmentalism, the ways in which it threatens to delimit discursive frameworks, define the boundaries of what is possible, and make "simple common sense" out of some partial truths, thereby legitimating continuing inequalities in power and well-being.
More generally, for reasons I have explored elsewhere in more detail (Li, 2001b) , I find the attempt to anchor legal rights in specific identities or sets of practices, and the effort to make these conform to territorial units (communities, ancestral domains) a problematic basis for justice. It segments the social and physical terrain, and allocates rights and obligations on a differential basis. It runs the risk of replicating old patterns of discrimination in new, environmental garb. The search must therefore continue for legal strategies which secure for uplanders the benefits of a fuller citizenship, and which offer them, and expect from them, no more and no less than other citizens. In order to tease out what these strategies might be, it will be necessary to go beyond the simplifications of the CBNRM model, and locate its assumptions more precisely within the changing political economy and ecology of upland settings.
A core concern of CBNRM has been to strengthen the capacity of communities to protect their natural resource base from the more destructive and rapacious activities of ruling regimes, among others. The model envisages a shift in power from states to communities, conceived as separate entities. Instead, as I have argued, states and communities are mutually constitutive. CBNRM offers governing regimes an opportunity to rearrange the ways in which rule is accomplished, while also offering communities an opportunity to realign their position within (but not outside) the state-system. Where citizens are indeed up against "vicious states", the potential of CBNRM to empower them is very limited. Older vocabularies about peasant 20 struggles, class conflict, and democracy are better able to name the problem, and to indicate the forms of collective action through which it might be addressed.
A vision of citizenship adequate to the political, economic and ecological dilemmas of the new century will need to draw upon a "concept of community, seen not as a given societyor culture outside of history but as a political association formed through processes of political and cultural creation and imagination -the generation of meaning in contexts of unequal power" (Roseberry, 1989:14) . Scholars, activists, donors, government officials and upland villagers all participate in the processes of cultural creation and imagination surrounding the concept of community, and are implicated in the attendant power relations. If scholars decide to refrain from critical engagement, they are party to a political economy of ignorance and complacency, questions unasked, issues not raised, data not collected and processes ignoredthe scenario that has long operated to the detriment of upland people, and that many advocates of CBNRM have worked hard to expose and critique. It is not easy to determine when "strategic simplifications" should be subject to scrutiny, and when they should be left alone (Brosius, 1999) . In setting out my arguments, I have been guided by my experience of the vibrant, self-reflexive character of the CBNRM movement in Asia, and my impression that it is more than capable of continuing a debate with scholars interested in tracking its progress and considering alternative means to reach common goals. Works Cited Acciaioli, G. (1998 Pieterse (1998) argues that the idea of development "alternatives" is increasingly incoherent in 4 the light of converging populist paradigms shared by governments, donors and NGOs.
See Fox (1997) for an attempt to address the discrepancy between low official numbers and the 5 much higher numbers estimated by advocates.
There is a deep but unacknowledged tension between the assertion that sustainable resource-6 managing communities have existed since eternity (thus proving their effectiveness and viability), and the idea that communities or groups need to be created, their social capital developed by outside stimulation and investment. See, for example, Pretty and Ward (2001) . In the Philippines, according to Gauld (2000:244-7) , the forest department (DENR) -heralded by donors for its progressive community-oriented programs -is convinced that community organization requires external intervention, a job contracted to NGOs at so much per hectare of forest land. The goal of this organizing is to form "communities" as legal-bureaucratic structures, which can be assigned leases and monitored like corporations.
According to Brown (1994:59 ) the significance of off-farm income sources and the need to 7 expand them have been neglected as a result of the natural resource fixation of outsiders.
The definition of forests, their anthropogenic or natural character, and the point at which a 8 particular land use regime is defined as forest-management rather than farming is another issue I do not pursue here (see Ellen, 1999; Peluso, 1996) . I tend to emphasize that upland people are farmers in order to balance the simplification which classifies their activities as forestry or forest management, making their farming, especially commercially oriented farming, relatively invisible.
A study of indigenous agroforestry in Amazonia showed that larger landholders could maintain 9 diverse and sustainable systems, while households with less land depleted their resource base, highlighting the significance of differentiation within indigenous communities and the problem with assumptions that indigenous systems are intrinsically stable, equitable and sustainable (Coomes & Burt, 1997) .
The Philippines was a net importer of timber by 1988 (McDermott, 2001:34) . Indonesia still 10 has significant timber stocks, enough to fuel patronage systems and entice major commercial interests (McCarthy, 2000a:120) .
Crasswell et al (1998) assess a range of agroforestry techniques.
11
For cautions about agroforestry, see Fujisaka (1989) . Some successful interventions are 12 described in Current (1995) . Sato (2000:164) highlights the "late developers trap", in which candidates for agroforestry cannot return to their traditional practices, but neither are they permitted to "move forward in the same way that 'modern' farmers have done".
Note that increased recognition of customary land rights and the attendant capacity to 13 negotiate does not guarantee sustainability: in two case studies of logging, recognition enabled communities to cut into logging profits from which they were previously excluded, but the logging continues. In East Kalimantan, leaders claiming to represent "customary communities" have been busy selling the rights to newly-recognized "traditional" (adat) forests, making use of maps prepared by NGOs for the opposite purpose: to strengthen customary land claims and traditional, sustainable, resource management systems (Obidzinski, 2001) . Adat leaders have also been active participants in "illegal" logging networks in Sumatra, where -unable to prevent logging on their lands -they have interpreted their customary rights as an entitlement to levy fees (McCarthy, 2000b:9) . No doubt the political and economic pressures on these communities are intense, and they are not necessarily to be faulted, but if this is indeed a trend, it needs to be exposed and addressed.
See Sato (2000) for a discussion of the way state simplification projects in Thailand make 14 certain people invisible (as when "state" forest mapping ignores resident populations) or catch them in between competing state agendas (beneficiaries of land allocations under land reform and, simultaneously, forest encroachers). Illegibility is sustained because of its strategic uses to particular state agencies (Sato, 2000:172) . James Scott's (1998) , argument that modernizing states seek legibility needs to be nuanced by the examination of selective vision at particular conjunctures.
Invisibility has been especially problematic for many uplanders in Thailand deemed non-15 citizens, and there have been fewer programs aimed at incorporating them within state-mandated frameworks. They continue to face statelessness and the possibility of expulsion across national borders (Ganjanapan, 1998) .
As shown in the Indonesian forest sector, for example, by McCarthy (2000b) .
16
Forest leases transfer management rights to communities, subject to a host of detailed 17 regulations equivalent to those imposed (though not necessarily enforced) upon commercial timber concessions (Gauld, 2000:239) .
McDermott (2001) program, a case study of how these match with on-the-ground realities in Palawan, and an assessment of both the limits of this program and the gains it provides to the communities she has studied.
